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Abstract—The Monterey Security Architecture addresses the 
need to share high-value data across multiple domains of 
different classification levels while enforcing information flow 
policies.  The architecture allows users with different security 
authorizations to securely collaborate and exchange information 
using commodity computers and familiar commercial client 
software that generally lack the prerequisite assurance and 
functional security protections.  MYSEA seeks to meet two 
compelling requirements, often assumed to be at odds:  enforcing 
critical, mandatory security policies, and allowing access and 
collaboration in a familiar work environment.   
Recent additions to the MYSEA design expand the architecture 
to support a cloud of cross-domain services, hosted within 
a federation of multilevel secure (MLS) MYSEA servers. The 
MYSEA cloud supports single-sign on, service replication, and 
network-layer quality of security service.  This new cross-
domain, distributed architecture follows the consumption and 
delivery model for cloud services, while maintaining the 
federated control model necessary to support and protect cross-
domain collaboration within the enterprise. The resulting 
architecture shows the feasibility of high-assurance, cross-domain 
services hosted within a community cloud suitable for inter-
agency, or joint, collaboration.  This paper summarizes the 
MYSEA architecture and discusses MYSEA's approach to 
provide an MLS-constrained cloud computing environment. 
Keywords: cloud computing, cross-domain services, 
collaborative applications, quality of security services. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a system that provides the ability to access 
or transfer information between two or more security domains 
is referred to as a cross domain solution (CDS) [1].   In the 
CDS context, three technology categories have been defined by 
the Unified Cross Domain Management Office:  access, 
transfer, and multilevel [2].  A cross domain access system 
allows a user to access information in different domains from a 
single machine but no information is transferred between 
domains.  A cross domain transfer system controls information 
moving between domains, e.g., a data guard.  A cross domain 
multilevel system manages information of different security 
levels stored in a common repository and enforces a mandatory 
security policy to control both information access and 
information flow.  Systems in the last category are also known 
as multilevel secure (MLS) systems. 
Access to information in an MLS system is governed by the 
classification level of the information, the security clearance of 
the requester and whether the requester has a need to access the 
information, i.e., the “need-to-know” caveat.  Mandatory 
access control distinguishes an MLS system from typical 
secure systems, where the latter are constructed using 
commercial operating systems that control access to 
information based on security attributes that can be changed by 
users, e.g., access control lists and file permissions in Windows 
or Linux.   
In addition to the MLS policy enforcement mechanism, 
support for robust user authentication, MLS-constrained 
services and dynamic security services are other desirable 
functionalities of a distributed MLS system architecture.   
However, experience has shown that applying security without 
considering usability leads to failure due to lack of user 
acceptability [3].  User-driven requirements, such as ease of 
learning and efficiency of use, gave impetus to our work on the 
Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) [4].   
Although originally designed to address the inefficient 
exchange of information in military “silo” environments, 
MYSEA has evolved to provide new capabilities for 
composing secure, distributed cross-domain services and 
transparent access to disparate single-level networks.  
MYSEA’s properties and capabilities have naturally developed 
to support an “MLS Cloud” – where features of cloud 
computing have been integrated with the high-assurance and 
strong policy enforcement required by MLS systems.  
Specifically, the MYSEA architecture has been designed to 
support agile and adaptive security provisioning, service 
replication, stateless “thin clients” whose data and applications 
are primarily provided as remote-hosted services, the sharing of 
costly (high-assurance) resources, and the ability to scale to 
support many simultaneous users.  Recent extensions to the 
MYSEA design include security enhancements to support the 
vertical integration of modern collaborative applications and 
network-layer quality of security service that allows the 
federation to dynamically adapt its security posture in response 
to network conditions (e.g., INFOCON threat levels) and 
policy constraints on the user session.  
The remainder of this paper describes the MYSEA system 
architecture, the composition of trusted and untrusted 
components, and a conceptual model for dynamic management 
of security services.  The paper concludes by reviewing related 
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work and summarizing our approach to designing a cloud-
oriented cross-domain computing environment. 
II. KEY CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
The provenance of multilevel security can be partially 
traced back to Anderson's seminal report which introduced the 
concept of a reference monitor and its implementation, i.e., the 
reference validation mechanism, and discussed the security 
threats and engineering problems related to multi-user 
resource-sharing systems [5, 6, 7]. The notion of a security 
kernel implementing the reference validation mechanism 
quickly became a well-studied design option for secure 
operating systems.   
Classic security kernels, e.g., PDP-11/45 [8], SCOMP [9, 
10] and GEMSOS [11], were developed for high assurance 
trusted operating systems, and, like the Boeing MLS LAN [12] 
and XTS-300 [13], were certified under the now-obsolete 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [14].  
The XTS-300 was originally certified for the second highest 
level of assurance defined by the TCSEC, i.e., Class B3.  Its 
successor, the XTS-400 [15], has been certified at Evaluation 
Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) under the Common Criteria Version 
2.3 [16].  The XTS-400’s operating system, the Secure Trusted 
Operating Program (STOP), enforces a unified mandatory 
access control security policy based on the Bell and LaPadula 
confidentiality policy [17] and the Biba integrity policy [18].  
The STOP security kernel provides the trusted foundation of 
the MYSEA server. 
A recent trend in trusted system development has been the 
use of separation kernels in avionics systems [19, 20], real-time 
embedded systems [21] and virtual machine monitors (VMM) 
[22].  With respect to security evaluation, the separation kernel 
approach was initially discussed in the context of a separation 
VMM [23] and was recently defined in the Separation Kernel 
Protection Profile (SKPP) [24].  In addition to the basic 
separation kernel, the SKPP includes security requirements for 
a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) [25], which 
supports finer-grained privilege controls based on the Principle 
of Least Privilege [26]. 
User identification and authentication (I&A) plays an 
important role in making access control decisions.   In an 
information system, users must be unambiguously identified 
and authenticated prior to gaining access to information [27].  
A secure system must afford users the ability to communicate 
with the trusted computing base (TCB) via a high integrity 
communication channel (i.e., a trusted path).  A user can 
invoke the trusted path via an unspoofable Secure Attention 
Key (e.g., a special keystroke sequence) to perform security 
functions that require user actions (e.g., user’s login, changing 
a user’s session level) [28].  Similarly, security-relevant 
communications between two trusted components in a 
distributed system must also be protected from unauthorized 
modification and disclosure via a trusted channel.  For non-
repudiation purposes, the identity of the end points of a trusted 
channel must be uniquely authenticated [28].   
In MYSEA, the TPE and TCM components support the 
establishment of remote trusted paths between users having no 
access to the system console (in the MYSEA cloud) and the 
MYSEA server, and trusted channels between the single-level 
network and the MYSEA server, respectively.  The XTS-400 
only supports local trusted paths between users having access 
to the system console and the XTS-400’s TCB. The trusted 
foundation of the TPE and TCM components is the Trusted 
Computing Exemplar LPSK [29].  The TCX LPSK, designed 
to conform to the SKPP, manages all resources on the platform, 
assigns a set of exported resources to different partitions and 
controls information flows between partitions as defined by the 
LPSK configuration data [30].   
The Internet Protocol security (IPsec) base architecture [31] 
and its associated protocols [32, 33, 34] have been widely used 
to implement cryptographic security services at the network 
layer.  The IPsec protocols support different sets of 
cryptographic algorithms, modes of operations (e.g., transport, 
tunnel) and key management schemes (e.g., Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE)).  IPsec is used in MYSEA to implement the 
protected tunnels between the trusted appliances (viz., TPEs 
and TCMs) and the MYSEA server.  
The quality of service (QoS) of a distributed system is 
commonly associated with a set of parameters representing 
different characteristics of individual applications or of the 
overall system [35, 36], not as a dimension of control. 
Traditional QoS mechanisms afford users the ability to select 
different classes of service related to various functional 
dimensions of a system such as accessibility, reliability and 
performance.  Security was considered as a QoS factor in a 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) mechanism that is based on 
the concept of variant security [37]. This QoSS model 
stipulates that the QoS mechanism must be capable of 
modulating strength of service according to specific levels of 
security requested by users, a resource management system or 
level of threat reported by an intrusion detection system.  The 
previous QoSS work also presents an approach for regulating 
IPsec cryptographic attributes (e.g., cryptographic algorithm, 
key length) in response to QoSS parameters such as the 
operating mode and security level of a network.  The Dynamic 
Security Services (DSS) mechanism in MYSEA extends this 
approach to support dynamic modulation of application 
services (hosted on the MYSEA Servers) based on the security 
level of a user’s session. 
 
Figure 1.  Monterey Security Architecture 
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III. OVERALL ARCHITECTURE 
MYSEA is a high assurance MLS-constrained cloud 
computing environment that allows authenticated users 
executing popular commercial applications to securely access 
data and services at different classification levels in the context 
of a single session.   
The MYSEA cloud is composed of a group of collaborative 
MYSEA Servers, each running on a highly trustworthy 
commercial MLS server platform, and a small number of 
special purpose trusted network interface components, i.e., the 
Trusted Path Extension (TPE) and the Trusted Channel Module 
(TCM).  The MYSEA Servers communicate with each other 
via a dedicated network and jointly provide centralized 
multilevel security policy enforcement.  The TPE ensures 
unspoofable authentication of users on one or more MLS local 
area networks and the TCM provides high assurance labeling 
of incoming traffic from multiple single-level networks.   
The commodity client workstations on the MLS LAN and 
system components on the single-level network provide users 
with the ability to run unmodified office productivity tools and 
collaborative applications.  High assurance network encryptors 
provide protected communication channels required for high-
value/classified data transmission between the MYSEA 
controlled environment and external networks (see Fig. 1). 
A. MYSEA Cloud Servers 
The nerve center of a MYSEA system is a cluster of MLS 
servers that cooperatively enforces a system-wide multilevel 
security policy and hosts policy-constrained application 
protocol servers.  The MYSEA cloud relies on four 
fundamental components. 
The Federated Services Manager handles queries about 
user sessions (required to implement single sign-on) and 
service availability if such information is not available on the 
local MYSEA Server. The Authentication Server enforces the 
identification and authentication supporting policy to ensure 
that only authorized users can gain access to the system. The 
Dynamic Security Services Manager implements a service 
management mechanism that can adjust to changing 
operational needs and situational threats.  The Application 
Server handles application requests from the MYSEA clients.  
Supported services include web browsing, wiki, WebDAV, 
email, webmail, VoIP direct call and voice mail.  Each service 
can be hosted on the same or separate MYSEA Servers. 
User credentials are shared among the MYSEA Servers in 
the federation, allowing an authenticated user to gain access to 
data and services on different MYSEA Servers without having 
to log in at each MYSEA Server.  
B. Special Purpose Trustworthy Components 
The Trusted Path Extension (TPE) and the Trusted Channel 
Module (TCM) are specialized devices that, under the direction 
of the MYSEA Servers, either block or pass data and service 
requests to the MYSEA Servers. 
The TPE is conjoined with an untrusted client workstation 
and acts as a gate keeper between the workstation and the 
MYSEA cloud.  It provides an interface that allows a user to 
establish a trusted path between the user and the MYSEA 
Servers.  Once the trusted path is established, the user can 
securely log in and negotiate a session level that is constrained 
by the user’s clearance.   The TPE also manages IPsec tunnels 
between itself and the MYSEA Servers whose cryptographic 
attributes are dynamically configured based on the TPE’s 
unique identification and the negotiated session level.  After a 
user session is initiated, the TPE forwards service requests 
from the workstation to the MYSEA Servers via these tunnels.   
While the TPE controls network connectivity to the MLS 
LAN, the TCM serves as a multiplexer that labels incoming 
network traffic from single-level services and remote networks, 
and forwards the labeled data to the MYSEA Server over an 
MLS network interface.  The TCM also uses IPsec to protect 
data transmitted between itself and the MYSEA Servers.   
Unlike the IPsec tunnels on the MLS LAN, the cryptographic 
attributes of the IPsec tunnels on a TCM’s MLS interface are 
determined based on the security attributes of the single-level 
components.  The use of the TCM in a particular operational 
environment depends on the number of physical network 
interfaces available in the federation. The TCM is used when it 
is necessary for multiple single-level networks to share the 
same physical network interfaces. 
C. Commodity Clients and Servers 
Users on the MLS LAN may interact with different MLS 
servers in the MYSEA cloud via stateless client workstations.  
These workstations are commodity platforms running 
commercial or open source operating systems and popular 
software applications, resulting in lower operating cost.  A TPE 
is associated with each workstation. The MYSEA Server 
interprets the actions of each workstation to be at the user’s 
negotiated session level, and the workstation’s system state 
must be purged at the end of each session to prevent residual 
data leakage.  To the extent possible, all user data objects and 
related metadata are stored on MYSEA Servers, not on the 
workstations; the exceptions are addressed by the workstation’s 
power-cycle protocol. 
Single-level services also run on commodity platforms.  
They include application services hosted on single-level servers 
in the local MLS enclave, and application services hosted on 
servers in remote single-level networks.  Single-level servers in 
local MLS enclave provide application services to both local 
and remote clients operating at the same classification level.  
The read-down capability will be provided to users on single-
level networks in a later implementation phase. 
D. Security Features 
The high-level design goals for MYSEA dictate that the 
architecture will 1) provide a distributed collaborative user 
environment that can interoperate with different platforms and 
be expandable in both functionality and performance, 2) adapt 
during run-time to support different threat conditions, e.g., 
normal, crisis, 3) require minimal user training and 4) scale to 
support up to 100 user workstations.  MYSEA also supports the 
following security features: 
• Secure connections to classified networks 
• Centralized security management 1703
• Use of adaptive security techniques to provide dynamic 
security services 
• True multilevel access to data at multiple levels of 
security using a single commodity workstation 
• Integration of multilevel security with existing 
sensitive networks using high assurance trusted 
communication channels 
• Secure single sign-on across multiple MLS servers 
• Server replication to support scalability 
• IPv6 in a multilevel context 
• Interoperability with the DoD PKI infrastructure 
• High assurance trusted path and trusted channel 
techniques for managing access to the MLS cloud. 
The next section discusses the major threats and 
assumptions pertaining to the current MYSEA implementation. 
IV. THREATS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The threat model for MYSEA includes both developmental 
threats and operational threats.  Insider attacks can be mounted 
in all phases of a system’s life cycle, e.g., during development 
or while in operation [38].   
Unauthorized changes to a system’s security mechanisms in 
any life cycle phase could adversely affect the system’s ability 
to enforce its security policies. Our rigorous development life 
cycle management processes [39] address the threats of 
subversion and unintentional errors made by the development 
team.   
It is assumed that organizational policies and operational 
procedures will be imposed to address exploitation by insiders 
or by unauthorized individuals with physical access to the 
networks, systems and facilities during deployment.  Attacks in 
the supply chain and malicious insertion of unintended 
functionality during delivery for which mitigations involve 
various forms of tamper detection and prevention are outside of 
our threat model. 
Operational threats include attacks on the network, 
malicious software and misbehaving users.  Network attacks to 
the communication protocols within the MLS LAN or the MLS 
cloud can be passive (e.g., traffic monitoring and analysis) and 
active (e.g., deliberate circumvention of protection features).  
To counter some of these threats, MYSEA depends on IPsec to 
provide confidentiality and integrity protection, data origin 
authentication, anti-replay service, and access control based on 
cryptographic keys [31]. 
Another type of active attack involves malicious software 
(e.g., Trojan Horse) that attempts to either directly or indirectly 
gain unauthorized access to information by leveraging the 
user’s own privilege [40].  This threat is mitigated in the 
MYSEA system by preventing the results of actions taken by a 
Trojan Horse from flowing to an object with less sensitivity.  
All resources on the MYSEA Servers are assigned security 
levels that are used by the underlying STOP security kernel to 
enforce policies for information confidentiality and integrity.  
The untrusted application protocol servers launched on behalf 
of the requesting workstations at the negotiated session level 
only have read-write access to resources at the session level 
and read-only access to resources at levels below the session 
level, effectively confining the actions of any Trojan Horse. 
User or application misbehavior includes attempts by users 
at the client workstation or their application software to bypass 
the TPE.  To mitigate these attacks, each TPE is required to 
register with the federation before any user actions are allowed, 
including the invocation of the trusted path. 
V. SECURITY POLICIES 
MYSEA controls access to resources (e.g., data objects, 
network interfaces) using both mandatory access control 
(MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC).  For MAC, 
MYSEA enforces lattice-based confidentiality and integrity 
policies [17, 18].  Information of different security 
classifications (e.g., TOP SECRET, SECRET NATO) is 
assigned different sensitivity labels which are used by the 
MYSEA Server to mediate access to data objects.  This type of 
control is also called non-discretionary since processes cannot 
manipulate or bypass the policy rules.  Under DAC policy, 
MYSEA access decisions are based on user identities and 
access permissions given to data objects by the users.  Unlike 
with MAC, processes acting on behalf of users can, at their 
discretion, control by whom and how a resource is accessed. 
In an MLS system, the enforcement of MAC and DAC 
policies must be supported by two accountability policies: 
Identification and Authentication (I&A) and Audit [14, 28].  
For I&A, the MYSEA Server ensures that users are afforded a  
trusted communication path between the user and the MYSEA 
Server, and that the user’s claimed identity and authentication 
credentials are validated before a user session is established.  
Regarding Audit, the MYSEA Server accounts for all users 
actions, either taken directly by the user (e.g., trusted path 
invocation) or by software acting on the user’s behalf (e.g., a 
web server process).  An audit trail of accesses is maintained 
and protected by the MYSEA Server. 
 
Figure 2.  MYSEA Dynamic Security Services Framework 
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VI. DYNAMIC SECURITY SERVICES 
To meet run-time adaptability objectives, MYSEA 
implements a service-based access control policy that restricts 
the client workstations to access services hosted on the 
MYSEA Server. The Dynamic Security Services (DSS) 
mechanisms support automatic revocation of access to 
application services (e.g., web browsing, email) and dynamic 
modulation of protection attributes of the IPsec tunnels in 
response to network conditions (e.g., INFOCON threat levels) 
and policy constraints on the user session (see Fig. 2). 
The DSS design follows the standard policy management 
paradigm that includes a policy input point (PIP), a policy 
repository, a policy decision point (PDP) and one or more 
policy enforcement points (PEP) [41].  A push model is used 
for policy delivery, i.e., the PDP pushes policy rules to the 
PEPs based on a triggering event.  The policy input point 
provides a human interface with which the system 
administrator can create, edit and promulgate policies.  This 
component interacts with the policy repository and the PDP.  
The policy repository stores the PIP-sanctioned policies and 
provides those policies to the PDP when requested.   The PDP 
retrieves policies from the policy repository and makes DSS 
control decisions on behalf of the PEPs which enforce device-
specific DSS policy rules.   
The DSS mechanism consists of the three elements.  The 
DSS Server acts as a PDP and services DSS requests from the 
DSS Client.  The DSS Client performs policy enforcement 
functions using an access control list in the form of IPsec rules 
and IKE security associations.  The DSS Administration Tool, 
operating as a PIP, allows the administrator to manage the DSS 
policies to reflect the system operating modes and the 
enterprise security policy in force.  The DSS Control Protocol, 
a custom TCP-based command-respond protocol, is used by 
these elements to communicate with each other (solid arrows in 
Fig. 2).  
MYSEA employs external intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) on the single-level networks to monitor for suspicious 
network activity on those systems.  IDS alerts generated by 
these systems are securely stored in single-level SQL databases 
on the MYSEA Server.  The IDS alerts are used by the security 
analysts to determine network conditions and security 
disturbances, which may result in a DSS policy change.  
Automation of policy changes based on IDS alerts is a topic of 
future research. 
 
Figure 3.  MYSEA Sofware Stack 
VII. MYSEA SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
The MYSEA trusted computing base (TCB) is composed of 
the MYSEA Server, the TPE and the TCM.  As illustrated in 
Fig. 3, a common core exists in all three TCB components:  a 
high assurance operating environment (i.e., LPSK [29] and 
STOP OS [15]), the Protected Communications Service (PCS) 
and DSS. The PCS component implements IPsec tunnels to 
protect communications between the TPE and the MYSEA 
Server, and between the TCM and the Server. The DSS 
component performs dynamic service management functions 
that include changing IPsec configurations and negotiating 
session keys. 
The Trusted Path Service (TPS) and Trusted Path 
Application (TPA) components are tightly coupled. The TPA 
on the TPE provides a human interface for the users to invoke 
the trusted path to login and establish a session.  On the other 
hand, the TPS on the MYSEA Server performs user 
authentication and session negotiation functions in accordance 
with the I&A policy. Similarly, the Trusted Channel Service 
(TCS) and the Trusted Channel Application (TCA) components 
work together to ensure that traffic between a single-level 
network and the MYSEA Server are properly labeled at the 
classification level of the particular network. 
Communications between MYSEA Servers in the 
federation is handled by the Federated Security Service (FSS).  
This component establishes an FSS session between two 
MYSEA Servers so that they can exchange federation 
management and single sign-on information.  The FSS also 
performs federation-wide initialization and cleanup functions.  
The Secure Session Service (SSS) and Trusted Remote Session 
Service (TRSS) are trusted components.  The SSS manages 
application requests from the client workstations and other 
MYSEA Servers in the federation while the TRSS manages 
network requests from remotely-executed applications.  These 
components have special privileges that allow them access to 
resources of different security levels. 
The Application Protocol Server (APS) and Remote 
Application (RA) components are not trusted and run at the 
security level of the user session from which they are invoked.  
Each APS is a TCP/IP protocol handler that is modified to 
provide cross-domain functionality, i.e., read-down.  MYSEA 
currently supports SMTP, IMAP and HTTP protocols which 
together afford users the ability to gather information (web 
browsing), collaborate (wiki and WebDAV) and communicate 
(email and webmail).  The RA is a modified client-side 
application process running on the MYSEA Server that uses 
MYSEA TCB interfaces to communicate with a server-side 
application running on a MYSEA Server or on an external 
single-level server.  A TFTP client program accessing a TFTP 
server on the Internet (e.g., to download certain data) is an 
example of accessing an external server. 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
The current MYSEA design supports many characteristics 
associated with cloud computing [42], including broad network 
access (MLS-constrained capabilities are accessible via 
standard web-based mechanisms by heterogeneous thick and 
thin clients), resource pooling (MLS computing resources, e.g., 
 1705
MLS servers, can be dynamically combined to support users in 
different domains with different computing demands), and 
measured services (DSS mechanisms can be viewed as a form 
of resource metering capability that can be utilized for service 
control and resource optimization).  MYSEA’s “MLS Cloud” 
is presently oriented towards the Cloud Software as a Service 
(SaaS) model, where the users (consumers) can access cloud 
applications from a web-based interface (e.g., webmail) but 
have little control over how those applications are managed.  In 
terms of ownership, administrative domain, and availability to 
a larger community, the MYSEA cloud could be deployed as a 
private cloud, a community cloud, or a hybrid cloud. 
MYSEA does not yet provide the ability to provision 
computing resources, such as servers and applications, 
unilaterally by the users (on-demand self-service) or 
automatically by the cloud (rapid elasticity). The future design 
of the “MLS Cloud” will explore the impact of providing these 
services; for example, does the dynamic resource provisioning 
associated with “on-demand self-service” create potential 
covert channels?  Supporting the Cloud Platform as a Service 
(PaaS) model is another potential enhancement that would 
allow the users to leverage MYSEA’s high assurance 
computing base, resulting in lower operating cost.  With PaaS, 
the users can create and deploy their own applications using the 
development tools and programming interfaces provided by the 
(MYSEA) cloud.   
IX. RELATED WORK 
Hinke suggested the idea of a high assurance server to 
provide a locus of multilevel secure control to single level 
clients [43]. Unlike in MYSEA's design, clients are restricted to 
a single level throughout their lifetime. Rushby and Randell 
[44] describe a design for a distributed secure system that 
utilizes trusted network interface units (TNIUs) to connect 
workstations at different access classes to a local area network, 
through which access to a distributed multilevel file server is 
provided. Over and above this  basic functionality, MYSEA 
presents a more general purpose client-server operating 
environment, whereby new application servers can be easily 
added to the system, and thin clients are easily supported. 
Non-distributed approaches to support access to multilevel 
data via COTS applications have been proposed [45, 46, 47]. 
Purple Penelope has limited assurance, as it runs as a user-level 
application wrapping Windows NT, and it does not support a 
modifiable session level. The other systems rely on an 
underlying reference validation mechanism to control access to 
multilevel data. The MYSEA project extends certain concepts 
from these projects to a distributed environment. 
Replication architectures [48] provide a simple technique to 
achieve near-term multilevel security by copying all 
information at low security levels to all dominating levels. 
MYSEA rejects this approach because, when considering many 
documents or security levels, replication scales so poorly as to 
be infeasible. 
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Network Pump [49] 
is a network guard that has been proposed as part of a larger 
network architecture connecting subnets at different sensitivity 
levels, resulting in a multiple single-level (MSL) network [50]. 
Starlight [51] was designed to support logically separate single-
level workstations connected by an MLS-aware switch to data 
management subsystems at different (single) levels. The capital 
and administrative costs of separately maintained single-level 
LANs is a drawback that MYSEA avoids. 
Regarding QoSS, there have been several efforts in this 
direction. A quality of protection parameter is provided in the 
GSSAPI specification [52]. This parameter manages the level 
of protection provided to a message communication stream by 
an underlying security mechanism (or service). Another 
approach is that of Schneck and Schwan [53], which discusses 
variable packet authentication rates with respect to the 
management of system performance.  
X. CONCLUSIONS 
Cloud computing promotes agility, scalability, 
collaboration, and sharing of resources across 
domains/organizations but inherits the same security risks 
associated with any distributed system handling high-value 
data and resources.  MYSEA integrates support for cloud 
computing functionality with the strong security properties 
provided by a high-assurance multi-domain system. MYSEA’s 
architectural elements consist of a federation of highly 
trustworthy MLS servers, a set of special purpose 
authentication components and commodity client workstations.  
MYSEA’s security features include strong cross-domain access 
controls, protection of system assets (data and services) with 
different security classifications, resource isolation, service 
replication and dynamic control of QoSS.  MYSEA also hosts 
MLS-constrained collaborative application services that are 
accessible via standard protocols (e.g., HTTP, SMTP/IMAP, 
SIP-based VoIP).  
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